What if the voters’ register for 2027 already contains voters who do not exist?
That is the question the Independent National Electoral Commission must answer, after Nigerians discovered faces suspected to be AI-generated in its preliminary voters’ register — alongside duplicate registrations, dead persons listed as voters, and missing details.
It is not an allegation from the opposition. It is INEC’s own register. And INEC’s own officers put the questionable records there.
The controversy started on 9 October, when INEC began displaying the preliminary register nationwide for public scrutiny until 15 October. On 26 October, it published the register online. That was when screenshots went viral — AI-like photographs, strange names, alleged duplicates and deceased persons. Some entries were traced to Ward 11 in Etsako West and Udomi in Esan Central, Edo State.
INEC spokesperson Mohammed Haruna acknowledged the concerns, but claimed the online version did not reflect all ongoing data-cleanup activities.
Its ICT Director, Lawrence Bayode, then admitted that some registration officers used their authorised login credentials to introduce questionable records into the database, but could not explain why. On 1 November, INEC Chairman Prof. Joash Amupitan said the commission was reviewing the records. INEC disclosed its biometric system had flagged 268 records for further examination ahead of the December 15 deadline for certifying the final register.
The admission raises more questions than answers.
If the commission had already identified questionable records and commenced cleanup during physical display, why upload a version still containing the disputed entries? Why make a tainted register public when, according to its own spokesperson, some entries had already been flagged? The explanations do not add up.
More troubling: Does INEC lack a central monitoring system to track what registration officers do with authorised credentials? If such a system exists, how did AI-looking photos and dead voters get through its verification?
And after investigation, what happens to the officers? INEC cannot keep announcing investigations without timelines, findings and consequences. That assurance is now a familiar script that leaves the public with no answers.
The AI photos are not the first data breach under Amupitan, who assumed office last year.
In May, Nollywood actor Emeka Ike, seeking the Nigeria Democratic Congress ticket for AMAC/Bwari Federal Constituency, protested at INEC’s AMAC office over alleged primary irregularities.
After the protest, Lere Olayinka, Senior Special Assistant on Public Communications to FCT Minister Nyesom Wike, posted screenshots on X showing Ike’s voter transfer details from Imo to FCT.
Olayinka questioned his eligibility, claiming he transferred on May 15. The screenshots appeared to come from INEC’s restricted Continuous Voter Registration administrative portal, accessible only to authorised officials.
In June, INEC denied an external breach but said a preliminary audit showed personnel accessed and disclosed the information without authorisation using valid internal credentials. Its audit trail identified the account involved. Police questioned Olayinka and detained an INEC electoral officer assigned to AMAC.
INEC’s narrative was that an official accessed Ike’s details and shared them with the AMAC officer, who forwarded them to Olayinka.
Ike then sued Olayinka and INEC for N10 billion at the Federal High Court, Abuja, alleging violation of his privacy and data protection rights.
By June 25, INEC confirmed suspension of the AMAC officer. Haruna said internal investigation was complete and the matter was referred to relevant authorities. Police and DSS had investigated, according to officials, but INEC said it was awaiting final reports before further disciplinary action. The commission said the officer admitted involvement and reportedly acted out of personal grievances from previous interactions with political actors.
Should personal grievance justify unauthorised disclosure of a citizen’s electoral data by an official?
The court advised an out-of-court settlement. But INEC and Olayinka filed responses seeking dismissal. INEC’s defence contradicted its earlier position.
It had initially acknowledged its personnel accessed Ike’s information through authorised credentials and released it without authorisation. In court, it argued the information was neither classified, sensitive, nor confidential. It claimed statutory authority under the Electoral Act 2026 to make voters’ information public without consent, and that the information published by Olayinka did not emanate from it.
Does INEC’s responsibility to display the register justify unauthorised retrieval and disclosure of a particular citizen’s information by its personnel?
If the commission acknowledged internal unauthorised access, how does it reconcile that with its preliminary objection? Were the disputed details part of information legally available for public scrutiny, or was the issue the manner of access and disclosure?
On October 28, Justice Salim Ibrahim dismissed Ike’s N10bn suit, upholding preliminary objections by INEC and Olayinka, ruling it incompetent and improperly constituted, and dismissing substantive claims for lack of proof. But dismissal does not mean the disclosure was authorised or the officer exonerated.
Since INEC suspended the officer and referred the matter, what has happened? Police and DSS investigations were reported completed by June, yet there is no public record of prosecution, dismissal or final sanction. No outcome from data protection authorities either.
Two separate data controversies under the current leadership. No evidence linking them, but both expose the same weakness — internal controls, conduct of personnel with authorised access, and zero consequences.
So, how secure is citizens’ electoral information? Are the 268 flagged records the full extent, or will more questionable entries emerge? How can Nigerians be certain the database is not being manipulated by individuals or groups seeking to influence 2027?
INEC must do more than assure Nigerians it is cleaning up. It must establish the full extent of irregularities, show who is responsible, and strengthen systems that regulate access and modification.
Transparency is not optional for an electoral body. Nigerians deserve to know the extent of irregularities, identities of culpable officials where lawful, findings of investigations, and sanctions imposed.
If an institution that decides who gets to vote cannot be transparent about the integrity of its own records and the conduct of its personnel, how can citizens trust that the 2027 elections it will conduct will reflect their will?
The credibility of 2027 begins with the credibility of the voters’ register. INEC must prove it can protect both.
By Marcel Mbamalu